ICT for Peacebuilding (ICT4Peace)

Eldis has launched an interesting group blog titled ICT for Democracy. Couple of very interesting posts already up there, including the use of SMS for activism and ICTs as a Trojan horse for democracy and development. 

It’s heartening to see others write on the same issues and solutions that I have been engaged in for the past couple of years.

You can already get Google Maps on the iPhone and now Nokia’s created a technology of its own to get location data to its higher end handsets. New to Nokia’s OVI platform is the maps feature that runs on Vista / XP and most of Nokia’s N-series and Symbian handsets. 

Wired Gadget Lab has a short review here and you can download the application from here. If someone gets this working, let me know if Colombo is featured on it?

Following up my previous post (Myanmar: The urgent need for communications and collaboration) I’ve been fairly skeptical at best about the “right / responsibility to protect” doctrine of the UN. It sounds like a great idea, but in practice is fraught with the dangers of abuse leave aside the legacy of such interventions for government, NGOs and local communities. The viciousness with which is was greeted in Sri Lanka lately, entirely for parochial reasons of the Government, nevertheless demonstrated the very real challenges associated with the establishment of R2P and consensus as to when, where, with whom and how it will be applied.

And it’s not as if the UN Security Council will easily come to any agreement on R2P either. Further, UN OCHA’s head honcho John Holmes earlier this month expressed his scepticism that the Right to Protect would help in any significant way in Myanmar:

In response to a correspondent’s question on the suggestion that the United Nations should invoke “the right to protect” to force the Government to accept international assistance, he stated that he did not think it would help, at the moment, to embark on what could be seen, at least by some people, as being on a confrontational path.  The United Nations was having useful and constructive discussions with the authorities and things were moving in the right direction, even though the United Nations wanted it to move faster.

In any situation like this, the Government, as the sovereign authority, was in charge of the aid efforts, he explained.  What the United Nations tried to do was to support the Government’s aid efforts as much as possible.  The present situation was no different from any other disaster, in that sense.

In an article that dealt with Bernard Kouchner, the French foreign minister’s proposal to invoke R2P in Myanmar to grant aid workers access to the country, Gareth Evans says that

The point about “the responsibility to protect” as it was originally conceived, and eventually embraced at the world summit - as I well know, as one of the original architects of the doctrine, having co-chaired the international commission that gave birth to it - is that it is not about human security generally, or protecting people from the impact of natural disasters, or the ravages of HIV-Aids or anything of that kind. Rather, “R2P” is about protecting vulnerable populations from “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” in ways that we have all too miserably often failed to do in the past.

Importantly however, Gareth goes on to note that the case of Myanmar presents a prima facie case for the application of R2P.

If what the generals are now doing, in effectively denying relief to hundreds of thousands of people at real and immediate risk of death, can itself be characterised as a crime against humanity, then the responsibility to protect principle does indeed kick in… There is, as always, lots for the lawyers to argue about in all of this, not least on the question of intent. And there will be lots for the security council to quarrel about as to whether air drops and the like are justified, legally, morally and practically. But when a government default is as grave as the course on which the Burmese generals now seem to be set, there is at least a prima facie case to answer for their intransigence being a crime against humanity - of a kind which would attract the responsibility to protect principle. And that bears thinking about, fast, both by the security council, and the generals.

We may question the moral authority of Gareth to say what he does, given his complicity in propping up Suharto’s brutal regime in Indonesia, but the argument he makes is an interesting one. In Burma and the Responsibility to Empower Patrick Meier suggests that “…it is high time we shift to people-centered disaster/conflict early warning & response” but notes accurately that State based disaster mitigation interventions are far from timely and efficient. As a solution, Patrick suggests “more decentralized and tactical approaches to rapid response”. I’ll be interested to find out what that actually means esp. in a situation like Myanmar. Does a people-centered approach push sovereignty aside? Would tactical responses include hostile air drops over affected areas?

Image from Operation Poomalai  - The Jaffna Food drop

Well over a decade ago, Operation Poomalai smacks of R2P - a hostile air drop by the Indian Air Force into a besieged city in the embattled North of Sri Lanka. Events after the airdrop led to the lifting of the siege onJaffna and the declaration of a cease-fire with the LTTE. However, this led to the disastrous Indian military intervention at the invitation of the Sri Lankan government that ended in their ignoble departure from Sri Lanka, leaving the country no better than when they came in to deal with the terrorist problems that were the cause of many humanitarian crises. 

Point is, even if R2P is invoked and the humanitarian community goes in to Myanmar, there is no guarantee at all that the junta will change. It’s also entirely possible that the humanitarian agenda at first leads to a more openly political one very quickly, mirroring then the situation now in Iraq where armed forces that went in on a false premise now can’t get out or stay on. Catch 22. In Myanmar this would mean, if the regime is to be changed, possibly billions of dollars of aid over the long term to set up mechanisms of democratic governance including national level ICT infrastructure. 

I wonder if the International Community is up to the task? What if it fails to muster the resources? What happens when the global media moves on, as it invariably will, to the next disaster? What happens to Darfur if resources allocated there are now shifted to Myanmar?

What happens when everyone has moved on and all that a citizen is left in Myanmar is a mobile? Should the legacy of all humanitarian aid be to ensure that communities who can communicate are the best defense against disasters and the strongest bulwark against the erosion of democracy?

Everyone’s got their knickers in a twist about Myanmar. No laughing matter this. Tens of thousands already dead, a casualty count that could go up to a mind-boggling 100,000, tens of thousands missing, millions displaced and a brutal junta that governs the country to boot. A disaster within a disaster. 

I’ve been forwarded or CC’d into literally dozens of emails this week by those who want to do something. Anything. INSTEDD sent me intimation of Sahana they’ve now got up and running on one of their servers. They are working hard to localise it in Burmese and though most of the modules are up and running (the SMS / email module is not), I sadly haven’t seen any real data on it as yet. INSTEDD’s also working on deploying some interesting technology that can support and strengthen collaboration. Eric and his team I have no doubt will play a significant role in coordinating and collaborating the disaster response. I’ve been sent some amazing KML files of medical and other logistics locations and hubs. Amazing because they are as comprehensive as one can get in a black-hole of a country where no one really knows anything for sure.

However, all the emails I’ve got have are littered with might, may, possibly, if, by chance, hopefully, could be, not sure, I think, last time I checked. Few are certain about anything other than the monumental challenge of addressing the urgent humanitarian needs of affected communities with a regime that’s not exactly helpful. Fewer have actually any experience of dealing with a repressive regime that’s as bad as the Burmese junta. By coincidence I came across an article today on the World Socialist Web Site that notes:

Since the cyclone engulfed Burma on May 3, there has been an incessant campaign in the international media to push for foreign militaries, along with aid officials, to be allowed into the country. Article after article contrasts the paranoia, incompetence and callousness of the Burmese junta with the supposed willingness of the US and other major powers to generously provide humanitarian assistance.

The Burmese junta has clearly demonstrated once again its repressive methods and callous disregard for human life. But the claim that Washington and its allies are acting purely out of concern for the Burmese people is simply a lie. 

The article goes on to make a simplistic case against US intervention that I don’t agree with, but I was partial to the essential critique of aid dynamics. Restraining myself to the dozens of emails I’ve got from some actors who want to do something in Myanmar and their ideas for information and communications technology support, I recall what I noted during Strong Angel III in 2006:

Given the paucity of bandwidth on the wireless networks and the intermittent connectivity in general, much of the information on-site has migrated from the world of bits to the world of atoms. I Information markers in the form of billboards, butcher paper, ribbons, printed maps, cardboard cutouts and scraps of paper have taken the place of the sophisticated information exchange and social networking built into the SA III website, which is by and large inaccesible on-site. This, in and of itself, is a valuable lesson.

For around a week, we had in the staging grounds of SA III more bandwidth that I could have commercially mustered in Sri Lanka. Theoretically, that is. In reality, we couldn’t even connect to the internet. The conflicts between the myriad of system, each in and of themselves offering the promise of connectivity yet together offering only confusion and conflict, was incredible. Collaboration remained a great idea, simply because models of collaboration based on ICT collapsed. We were reduced to physical meetings and Post-It notes. 

I have noticed that some of the same people involved with SA III (and for the record, they are good people with good intentions) are now agog with ideas on communications provisioning for Myanmar. Everyone wants to go guns blazing - which during SA III was precisely what brought down comms for everyone. Spectrum allocation and technical disputes that could have been easily resolved by advance planning and moderation simply did not occur or post facto, were too complex to manage. 

I am not alone in my frustration that the desire to do something often trumps the need for collaboration and a more robust understanding of just what we want to do, how we want to go about it, with whom, why, where and the context we operate in BEFORE we parachute in with money, equipment, love and fresh air. There are others who have expressed their disquiet with what are essentially marketing strategies in the guise of humanitarian relief. 

It sounds cruel, but perhaps people need to die for change to occur. Perhaps we should have taken the word of the junta that all was hunky-dory with its disaster response. Perhaps we should have left it to manage on its own and concentrated our efforts to maintain the fickle interest of global media over the longer term. 

But if that’s not really an option, what can we do? 

• From an ICT perspective, we can stop marketing our products and start figuring out how to work together. Everyone brings value to the table - the question is how to build synergies, strengthen complementarity, ease conflicts and augment interoperability and best practices.
• Business can help humanitarian aid, but the questions I raised at Strong Angel III on commercial enterprise and its engagement with relief work and the guidelines drawn up by UN OCHA need to be taken into consideration. There’s a delicate balance between in-country ad hoc solutions and pre-planned international best practices that can feed into deployments. Often, the best laid plans go awry minutes into deployment.
• Collaboration helps. A powerful transmitter able to provide blanket coverage to a wide footprint but buggers local communications isn’t all that helpful. Spectrum management, bandwidth allocation with multiple pipes, clients both mobile and fixed, data security and P2P network transports are just some of the headaches deployments will have to plan for as much as possible. Strong Angel III’s communications team may be able to help along with others. 
• Marketers with little understanding of and no interest in collaboration should shut up and bugger off. 
• Global media, when more robust ICTs are deployed in-country, must take care to not hog the bandwidth better used to save lives. 
• Sadly, nobody on the comms side is talking with Burmese socio-political experts to bounce off ideas whether plans for in-country collaboration with government and NGOs will actually work. Surely there must be more than a few in the West who can offer this kind of vital feedback? Western assumptions about aid and relief rarely gel with local cultural, social, political and religious contexts.
• We also know that multiple wifi / wimax deployments without any kind of technical management and spectrum dispute resolution almost guarantee that no one gets connected at all. So why are we still talking about a hundred and one different ways of getting wireless connectivity into the country with little interest in harmonisation of available bandwidth?

The case is often made with great passion and vigour that we must do something to help Myanmar. That’s good. But the responsibility to protect is not just about going in without host nation support to do good. If it comes to that, the international community and the ICT community in particular need to be certain that they don’t add to the choas, are able to provide vital comms support for relief operations from the get-go. 

I doubt that this confidence exists. Is it a case for doing nothing? Clearly not. But I just wish that those who want to help today remember that the same desire led, ironically, to severe communications breakdowns in the past.

Lessons identified perhaps, but not learnt?

I was invited by Lirneasia to a presentation on Sahana’s new SMS module yesterday. Lara’s live blogging of the event is available here. The module works well and looks nice and is particularly well suited for sending early warning messages to the disaster response network of Sarvodaya around Sri Lanka (there’s an acronym for this that I can’t remember). Scalability of the module to deal with a larger constituency (thousands of journalists and millions of citizens) is very suspect, but that’s not what it was designed for. As was explained to us, it’s also a problem of the sequential nature of sending SMSs out from the system.

But as was noted, no tests to date have been made on the actual performance of the system that for the moment runs on Dialog. My experience with SMS communications last year after a bombing close to home suggests that SMS is also prone to congestion that can last for hours, though a technical agreement with Dialog may possibly address this by prioritising message delivery for a specific set of numbers.

Cost was whatever the cost of sending an SMS within or through the Dialog network. It was clear that setting up this module needed to be done in consultation with (or at the very least, adequate notification given to) the mobile telecoms provider it used for message delivery. Else, as was pointed out, warning messages to hundreds could easily be shut down by automated SMS spam guards, which would defeat the purpose of the system.

One suggestion I had was to simplify their three character survey response code. My suggestion was to limit the characters to the first key press of a mobile keypad (a,d, g, j, m, p, t, w and *, 0 # if necessary) since multiple key presses to get to the other letters could lead to, particularly when also dealing with a chaotic context, high levels of stress and possibly sleep depravation, higher levels of error in input. 

The suggestion was also made to made the UI a bit more like Twitter, with notification of how many characters had been used in a message and how many there were left. 

It would also be necessary for Sahana to encourage the best practice of the most urgent numbers at the top of any group list, given the sequential nature of SMS delivery, ensuring that they got the message first. It would be useful then to also encourage the creation of groups based on geo-location - so that say in the case of a tsunami alert, disaster responders along the coastal belt most likely to be affected could be alerted as first and then others. Extrapolating key numbers from a group that contained a whole bunch of numbers at the time of sending the message out would be next to impossible. 

It would be interesting to see if the Government Information Dept. or National Disaster Management Centre takes this up as a means of communicating disaster early warning and subsequent information to journalists and other key actors. A key conversation in this regard was facilitated by an article of Chamath Ariyadasa from JNW news on Groundviews, well worth reading even today.

One feature I would like to see in the Sahana SMS module is an automated keyword response mechanism, akin to what FrontlineSMS already has. For example, someone in the field types “emc colombo” which could be a short-code understood by the system as a request for emergency contacts for that particular location / district / GN division. Those managing the module would be responsible for updating responses with current information. So in this example, “emc colombo” could result in as SMS like “N.D. Hettiarachchi, dndmc@sltnet.lk, +94112431590 T, +94112431593 F”.

It would be interesting if the system actually logged the delivery time of messages to the extent made possible by delivery receipts with Dialog and Mobitel (maybe with Tigo too). It would be interesting to get a a baseline on a normal day (a dry run of the system with Sarvodaya’s network) and another during an actual disaster warning / early response context to compare how the system deals with stress placed on it and on the larger mobile network. 

I wonder if Sahana can and will provide this module as a web service delinked from the larger Sahana system? I can see far broader applications for this than disaster early warning and a web services approach or at worst a thin client approach would allow it to be used by those who don’t necessarily want or need the full blown Sahana system. 

I’m excited for Ken Banks.

I’ve written on FrontlineSMS on this blog before, so I won’t go into details about what it is and how great a programme I think it is. Ken’s launched the new version of FrontlineSMS and it’s got a spiffy new website to boot. 

Recently, I tried to use the new version in its beta form for the Eastern Provincial Council election work in Sri Lanka, but it just did not play nice with my Nokia 3310c phone on Vista. The programme “saw” the phone but just did not connect. I have a good mind to save up some money and go for a GSM modem (as Ken recommends) to test out the full functionality of this programme and its potential for the work I do in Sri Lanka, though I feel that asking those who want to use this programme to its fullest potential to also buy new equipment is not cricket. 

I wish Ken well in this latest avatar of what is already a well proven system. My concern however is that the version I tested still required more than a little technical knowledge to get up and running - technical knowledge that the grassroots NGOs that would find this programme the most useful simply don’t have. How many readers of this post know how to (re)configure COM ports, set up modems, disable Nokia Phone Manager software, fiddle around in the Windows Control Panel and enable administrator privileges for the (beta version) programme to even start on Vista?

So there’s the programme’s Achilles Heal. Powerful in the right hands, still too technical and leaves too much to chance to be promoted as a advocacy tool that grassroots NGOs can use for their advocacy from the get-go. To be fair though, FrontlineSMS is the closest I have seen to such a system and Ken’s dedicated to ironing out the flaws and making this more accessible to a wider audience. 

In the meanwhile, take the tour and request a download. The beta version still only really runs on Windows. Ken claimed it ran on OS X, but the Windows executable beta version I downloaded did not and frankly could not, given that it was packaged for Windows platforms only. Since the programme is based on Java though, I’m looking forward to true OS agnosticism in the near future. 

All the best Ken. So when are you going to make this open source?

Some data and programmes used in and from CMEV’s election monitoring platform.

1. Email updates sent during the course of the day - 15,500 via local SMTP server
2. Data sent (via ADSL) - approx. 750Mb
3. Data sent (via SLT 3G HSPA) - approx. 150Mb
4. Data received (via ADSL) - approx. 1Gb
5. Data received (via 3G HSPA) - approx. 200Mb
6. Websites and services used - WordPress, Google Maps, Twitter, Internet Archive, Technorati, Reinvigorate, Facebook
7. Programmes used - Quicktime 8 Pro (podcast recording), Garageband (podcast production), Safari 3.1, Firefox 3 Beta 5 (running on projector in operations room with key information), Skype, Call Recorder for Skype, Twhirl, Maxbulk Mailer
8. Programmes that failed - CC Publisher (hugely unreliable and miserably slow on Leopard)
9. Assumptions that failed - Didn’t get half as many SMS updates as we thought we would even though CMEV designed a superb SMS template for incident reports. Coverage of all major telcos in the East just shy of urban areas ranges from poor and intermittent to wholly non-existent. Towards evening, services became even more erratic.
10. Assumptions that worked - More interest in maps than (textual) reports
11. # of time my Macbook Pro / OS X crashed during the day - 0

The problem with cloud computing is two fold.

One, the assumption based on the marketing spiel and hype that surrounds it that nothing will ever go wrong with data stored on and accessed via the Internet and web. Two, when something awry does occur, the almost complete inability for cloud services and products to continue functioning with even reduced functionality. Google Gears and Adobe’s AIR may offer some relief, but the WordPress outage for over 2 hours this morning (SL time) was a sobering reminder than reliance on hosted / cloud solution comes at a price - when things go wrong, one is at the complete mercy of the service providers.

CMEV’s blog went down with the WordPress outage. We’ve been getting a fair number of page views on it after yesterday’s interesting elections in the Eastern Province. It was annoying to see that WordPress was down this morning and even more so when the time given for downtime turned out to be a gross misrepresentation of the time it actually took to get WordPress.com up and running again (messages on my account kept saying 21 minutes more, went down to 1 minute and then kept going up to 18 or 19 minutes for around 2 hours!). 

With everyone talking about cloud computing usurping our desktop centric storage / access / dissemination paradigm I really wonder if we’ll hit a stage in which downtime is guaranteed to not occur, or whether it is possible with science to give such a guarantee?

While we wait, some short common sense strategies for redundancy and the preservation of sanity during downtime esp. for ICT4Peace applications:

Diversify media. CMEV also has a Twitter channel that I was able to post updates on the outages to. CMEV also hosted it’s maps with election violence updates on Google Maps. Combined with Twitter, I could have run the updates even without WordPress. I also used Twitterfeed to update the Twitter channel with content from the CMEV blog automatically. I also hosted the podcasts outside WordPress on Internet Archive, giving access to them even when the site was down.

Diversify access. To the extent possible, make sure critical applications aren’t reliant on a single ISP or connection. I used SLT ADSL and SLT 3G HSPA interchangeably over election day to update the CMEV sites with content. 

Backup and mirror. All CMEV sitreps and incident updates were mirrored on the old CPA site.

Email. Plain old email updates work just fine when you want to alert a few key people on new content, who then spread the word in a viral fashion. 

Expect the block and outage. Plan at the outset for the worst case scenario. 

Use RSS. It helps gets the message out. Don’t expect people to come to your website to get the news. 

Don’t be old school and stingy. Full RSS feeds may reduce the number of those who visit your site, but they get the content out in a manner that’s accessible even if the site goes down for a bit. Combined with a service like RSSFwd, can be a powerful way to disseminate content that makes it virtually impossible for Governments to clamp down on (unless they go the route of Myanmar, but that’s it own defense). 

Go mobile. Make your site accessible to mobiles. It pays off. There are a couple of plugins for WordPress that do this if you host the site on your own. Mofuse is a great (free) service is you use a hosted WordPress (or any other blogging) service / site. 

Need to write a book about these strategies in more detail sometime…

Complementing the micro-blogging initiative set up to generate reports from citizen on election violence and malpractices, set up a Google Maps based solution for the Centre for Monitoring Election Violence (CMEV) to put election related incidents on a map.

There are currently two maps. See here for details.

1. Click here to get updates from CMEV field monitors in the field on election day (10 May 2008).
2. Click here to get a list of locations that registered election related incidents in the lead up to election day.

Visit CMEV’s blog for more updates.

We are getting most of our updates from mobile phone, which is going to create some problems if the government decides to block mobile phone communications (again) today.

From the CMEV Media Communique 1:

CMEV is gravely concerned by reports that mobile telecommunication access to and from the east will be suspended from tomorrow, polling day. Were this to be the case, it would be an arbitrary restriction on the access and right to information of all citizens and of citizens in the east, in particular, on the day of their provincial polls. Given that political parties and monitors have expressed their fears about the freeness and fairness of the provincial poll, such a restriction, if implemented, would only serve to reinforce these fears and adversely impact on the credibility of the poll.

Accordingly, CMEV calls upon the Election Commissioner to take the speedy action necessary to ensure that such a violation of democratic rights does not take place.

It won’t be the first time the government has shut off mobiles and curtailed communications in the East, but this time around, I wonder what their excuse will be?